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Abstract This study empirically analyses the exclusion of
companies from investors’ investment universe due to a
company’s business model (sector-based exclusion) or due
to a company’s violations of international norms (norm-
based exclusion). We conduct a time-series analysis of the
performance implications of the exclusion decisions of two
leading Nordic investors, Norway’s Government Pension
Fund-Global (GPFG) and Sweden’s AP-funds. We find that
their portfolios of excluded companies do not generate an
abnormal return relative to the funds’ benchmark index.
While the exclusion portfolios show higher risk than the
respective benchmark, this difference is only statistically
significant for the case of GPFG. These findings suggest
that the exclusion of the companies generally does not
harm funds’ performance. We interpret these findings as
indicative that with exclusionary screening, as practiced by
the sample funds, asset owners can meet the ethical
objectives of their beneficiaries without compromising
financial returns.
Keywords ESG  GPFG  AP-funds  Exclusions 
Exclusionary screening  Divestment  Negative screening 
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Introduction
Over the last few decades, the general public has increas-
ingly become aware of the social, environmental and eth-
ical impacts of the investment and financing decisions of
large financial institutions. Through movements like
Occupy Wall Street, the public is gradually calling into
question the ability of these players to serve the economy
and society as well as to act in the best interests of their
ultimate beneficiaries (Blanc and Cozic 2012). This
development coincides with the emergence of the idea that
investors are indirectly responsible for the corporate mis-
conduct of the companies they hold. Especially public
pension funds and other large public asset owners, such as
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF), have been openly accused
of complicity when financing companies that are involved
in unethical behaviour, including violations of human
rights and labour rights, gross corruption and environ-
mental pollution. This investor group is especially sus-
ceptible to public scrutiny as it invests large sums of state-
owned assets for the benefit of the general public, the
funds’ ultimate beneficiaries (Richardson 2011). On a
global scale, this scrutiny has strongly increased since the
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008—although it is not a
new development in the Nordic countries. Investments
made by Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global
(GPFG) and the Swedish AP-funds regularly make the
headlines in the media.1 The GPFG is the SWF of Norway,& Lisa Schopohl
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1 For example, the Swedish AP-funds have been heavily criticised for
their holdings in Total AS, after the company was incriminated of
corruptive practices and collaboration with the dictatorship in Burma
(Bengtsson 2008b). Similarly, the Norwegian GPFG has come under
attack for owing shares in the mining company POSCO after
allegations against the firm emerged regarding its involvement in




established to invest the revenues from Norway’s oil and
gas exploration with the objective to ensure the long-term
wealth of current and future generations of Norwegians
(Richardson 2011; Jensen 2016b). With assets worth
almost USD 900 billion, it is one of the largest SWFs in the
world.2 Although slightly smaller in size, the Swedish AP-
funds which constitute the national pension system of
Sweden also rank among the largest global asset owners
(Severinson and Stewart 2012).
One reaction of these investors to the increased scrutiny
is divesting from companies associated with unethical
behaviour. For example, following several instances where
the Norwegian GPFG attracted attention for holding com-
panies involved in the production of controversial weapons
and tobacco, the Norwegian Government devised ethical
guidelines to ban these investments, together with invest-
ments in companies that contribute to serious human rights
violations, severe environmental damage, gross corruption
and other particularly serious violations of fundamental
ethical norms.3 The Swedish AP-funds have similar
guidelines that require them to consider the ethical and
environmental implications of their investments (Sandberg
et al. 2014; Du Rietz 2016).
The growing popularity of exclusionary screening by
large institutional investors appears to be in contrast to the
general consent in the academic literature on socially
responsible investment (SRI) which positions that exclu-
sionary screening is an outdated approach.4 This literature
argues that SRI has moved on to more sophisticated
strategies, such as active ownership and engagement as
well as positive screening and best-in-class investing (e.g.
Sparkes and Cowton 2004). In addition, a large part of the
literature concludes that exclusionary screening and espe-
cially screening on industries that offer products and ser-
vices considered as sinful and/or unethical financially hurts
investors as these ‘‘sin’’ stocks tend to offer superior
financial performance (e.g. Fabozzi et al. 2008; Adler and
Kritzman 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). By
excluding these firms from their investment universe, asset
owners might forgo profitable investment opportunities
‘‘and thereby sacrifice vast sums of wealth through time’’
(Adler and Kritzman 2008, p. 55). This finding poses a
potential conflict between the ethical and financial objec-
tives of these funds, given that their financial objective is
traditionally interpreted as the duty to maximise benefi-
ciaries’ long-term wealth.
This study attempts to address the question whether a
conflict truly exists between the ethical and financial
expectations faced by these asset owners. In other words,
can the funds incorporate the ethical views of their bene-
ficiaries without sacrificing financial returns? To answer
this question, we focus on one particular SRI approach that
is aimed at reducing investor’s exposure to unethical
business practices: exclusionary screening. In particular,
we analyse the performance implications of the exclusion
decisions by the Norwegian GPFG and the Swedish AP-
funds. These funds exclude companies either due to the
unethical nature of the sector that the company operates in
(sector-based exclusions) or due to the company’s
involvement in violations of ethical standards and norms
(norm-based exclusions). Our results suggest that the
excluded companies neither significantly under- nor out-
perform relative to the funds’ performance benchmarks.
These findings hold for the entire portfolio of excluded
companies and when separating the performance effect by
reason for exclusion. We interpret these findings as evi-
dence that by using specific forms of sector-based and
norm-based screens asset owners can meet both, their
beneficiaries’ ethical and financial objectives.
Our study makes several important contributions to the
academic literature on exclusionary screening. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first study to systematically
analyse the performance effect of exclusionary screening
by two of the leading institutional investor groups, i.e.
public pension funds and SWFs. So far, the literature has
either constructed theoretical portfolios by applying
exclusionary criteria to a predefined investment universe
(e.g. Adler and Kritzman 2008; Fabozzi et al. 2008; Hong
and Kacperczyk 2009; Durand et al. 2013b; Salaber 2013;
Trinks and Scholtens 2015) or it has analysed the perfor-
mance of SRI mutual funds that apply exclusionary
screening (e.g. Barnett and Salomon 2006; Renneboog
et al. 2008b; Lobe and Walksha¨usl 2011; Humphrey and
Lee 2011; Capelle-Blancard and Monjon 2014; Humphrey
and Tan 2014). While our finding of an insignificant per-
formance effect is generally in line with findings derived
from the SRI mutual fund literature, we contribute to this
literature in several ways.
Firstly, as pointed out by Sparkes and Cowton (2004,
p. 50), ‘‘the rapid growth in pension funds [and SWFs] that
have adopted socially responsible criteria means that such
2 The most recent market values of GPFG’s assets can be obtained
via the following homepage: http://www.nbim.no/.
3 In early 2016, two new criteria have been included in GPFG’s
guidelines. One criterion targets conduct resulting in unaccept-
able greenhouse gas emissions at the aggregate company level. The
other criterion, a sector-based screen, focuses on mining companies
and energy producers with 30 % or more of revenues from thermal
coal (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2016). As these exclusion
policies were introduced after the end of our sample period, we do not
include them in our empirical analysis. The latest version of the
guidelines for exclusion of companies from GPFG’s portfolio can be
found here: http://etikkradet.no/en/guidelines/.
4 For the purpose of this study, we apply the broad definition of SRI
used in Renneboog et al. (2008a, b) and Scholtens and Sieva¨nen
(2013). They define SRI as a way by which investors account for
environmental, social, governance (ESG) and ethical issues in the
investment process.
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research can no longer be regarded as representative’’.
Secondly, public asset owners have a considerably differ-
ent relation to their beneficiaries than mutual funds
(Richardson 2011). Not only do they invest on behalf of a
far larger stakeholder group with non-uniform interests and
ethical standards (Bengtsson 2008a, b; Richardson 2011),
the ultimate beneficiaries of these funds also do not have
the option to ‘‘exit’’ the fund, in case they do not agree with
the fund’s investment objectives and/or are not willing to
bear potential costs of applying ethical standards (Clark
2004; Sandberg et al. 2014). As a consequence, the public
scrutiny and societal pressures on these public asset owners
are higher than for the average mutual fund (Blanc and
Cozic 2012; Hawley 2016). Finally, the exclusions of
GPFG and the Swedish AP-funds have a strong signalling
effect on other global asset owners with many investors
following their exclusion decisions (Bengtsson 2008a;
Scholtens and Sieva¨nen 2013; Jensen 2016b; Du Rietz
2016). Such domino effects of exclusion decisions are
hardly observed for SRI mutual funds, rendering the
exclusions of the investors studied in our sample of greater
importance to the overall financial markets as well as to the
corporations that are being excluded.
Our study also contributes to the emerging literature on
norm-based screening. This practice of divesting from
companies based on the company’s association to viola-
tions of international norms is said to have originated in
Scandinavia but it increasingly gains momentum among
other large asset owners (Blanc and Cozic 2012; Du Rietz
2016). Currently three studies explicitly address norm-
based screening. Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014)
study French SRI mutual funds and contrast the perfor-
mance differences between funds applying sector-related
screens and norm-based screens. The studies by Blanc and
Cozic (2012) and Meller and Husson-Traore (2013) com-
pare the application of norm-based screening across
European asset owners, however, without addressing the
performance effects of such exclusions. Thus, we are the
first to study the performance impact of norm-based
screening by large public asset owners.
Besides these conceptual contributions, we also address
some of the methodological concerns of previous studies
on exclusionary screening. Previous research on exclu-
sionary screening has either been criticised for neglecting
real-world investment restrictions (see the criticism by
Adamsson and Hoepner 2015, and Hoepner and Zeume
2014) or the inability to disentangle the performance effect
of the exclusionary screening from other fund-specific
factors such as manager skill (see Humphrey and Tan
2014). In comparison, by looking at the exclusion lists of
GPFG and the AP-funds we are able to exactly identify the
excluded companies, together with the reason and time of
exclusion, thus enabling us to abstract from confounding
fund-specific factors such as manager skill. At the same
time, we automatically account for real-world investment
restrictions by focussing on the funds’ actual divestments.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows.
‘‘Literature Review’’ section provides an overview of the
literature on the special role of the GPFG and the AP-funds
in promoting ethical standards as well as on the perfor-
mance effects of exclusionary screening. In ‘‘Research
Questions and Hypotheses Development’’ section, we for-
mulate the research questions and develop testable hy-
potheses. ‘‘Data and Methodology’’ section introduces the
data and methodology used for testing the performance
implications of the exclusion decisions of the GPFG and
the AP-funds, while ‘‘Results’’ section presents the results
of the empirical analysis and a discussion on the perfor-
mance impact of exclusionary screening. We test the
robustness of our findings in ‘‘Robustness Tests’’ sec-
tion. ‘‘Conclusion’’ section draws the main conclusions
based on the findings and discusses the implications of our
findings.
Literature Review
The GPFG and the AP-funds: Balancing Ethical
and Financial Objectives
Compared to other major financial markets such as the U.S.
or the U.K., relatively little research exists on the Scandi-
navian SRI market and its major players. Notable excep-
tions include the studies by Bengtsson (2008a, b) and
Scholtens and Sieva¨nen (2013) which analyse the historical
development of SRI and its drivers in the Scandinavian
market. More closely related to our study, Sandberg et al.
(2014) compare the legal environment regarding SRI in
Sweden with the fiduciary duty concept in Anglo-American
countries and particularly focus on the conflicting expec-
tations faced by the Swedish AP-funds regarding their
beneficiaries’ financial and ethical interests, while
Richardson (2011) discusses the tension between financial
and ethical demands for the GPFG. In addition, Jensen
(2016a, b) and Du Rietz (2016) provide overviews on the
current state of the SRI development in Scandinavia as a
whole, and in Norway and in Sweden in particular.
Besides, several studies review the investment framework
and policy guidelines of the GPFG (e.g. Clark and Monk
2010; Myklebust 2010; Chambers et al. 2012; Dimson
et al. 2013) and the AP-funds (Severinson and Stewart
2012), touching on topics of SRI and the funds’ particular
duties as public asset owners. Yet, no study explicitly
analyses the performance implications of the SRI approa-
ches adopted by the GPFG and the AP-funds, especially
regarding their most prominent feature, their exclusion
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policies.5 The following section reviews the above studies
while focusing on the funds’ special relation to their ben-
eficiaries which distinguish public asset owners from other
market participants such as SRI mutual funds. We also
show that the demands from beneficiaries have been the
primary driver to adapt exclusionary screening.
As highlighted in Richardson (2011, p. 22f.), ‘‘SWFs
[such as the GPFG and other large public asset owners like
the AP-funds] resemble institutional chameleons in the
conflicting expectations they face. They operate like pri-
vate investment vehicles for maximising shareholder value,
while encumbered with public responsibilities to fulfil the
ethical policies of their state’’. In terms of their financial
objectives, both funds are expected to maximise long-term
financial returns. The GPFG is required by the Norwegian
Government to achieve a high return for the benefit of
future generations, which is widely interpreted as the duty
to maximise financial returns, within acceptable risk limits
(Bengtsson, 2008a, b; Richardson 2011; Chambers et al.
2012; Dimson et al. 2013). In fact, GPFG has achieved an
absolute return of 5.27 % per annum, i.e. a return of
0.51 % per annum in excess of its benchmark index, on its
equity investments since its inception in 1998, which
indicates that GFPG has been reasonably successful in
achieving its financial objective.6 Similarly, in case of the
Swedish AP-funds, the National Pension Insurance Funds
Act requires them to ‘‘manage fund assets in such a manner
so as to achieve the greatest possible return’’ (cited
according to Sandberg et al. 2014).7 As such, the financial
objectives of these funds are not different to those faced by
most private market actors. However, due to their status as
public asset owners, these funds are also obliged to fulfil
the ethical standards expected from them by the general
public. In case of the Swedish AP-funds, a legal require-
ment was introduced in 2001 that obliges the funds to
consider ethical and environmental aspects in their
investment policies and led the funds to establish a new
investment policy that involves the exclusion of companies
that are not in line with universally agreed ethical and
environmental standards (Bengtsson 2008b; Sandberg et al.
2014).8 GPFG’s turn towards ethics started in 2002 with its
first ethically motivated divestment and resulted in GPFG’s
implementation of a range of detailed ethical guidelines
(Bengtsson 2008b; Jensen 2016b). The current version of
the ethical guidelines restricts the fund from investing in
companies that contribute to serious human rights viola-
tions, severe environmental damage, gross corruption and
other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical
norms as well as in companies related to the production of
tobacco and controversial weapons.
While the direct reason for the funds’ move towards
ethical exclusionary screening relates to legal changes, the
governments themselves were responding to pressures
from the public that did not want to see state assets invested
in unethical business practices and thus act as accomplices
to gross, systematic breaches of ethical norms (Bengtsson
2008b). In fact, both the Swedish AP-funds and Norway’s
GPFG named the avoidance of complicity and the appeal to
public trust as main drivers for establishing their ethical
investment policies of exclusionary screening (see Sand-
berg et al. 2014, for the AP-funds, and Richardson 2011,
for the GPFG). In contrast to mutual fund investors, the
beneficiaries of the GPFG and the AP-funds do not have
the option to exit the funds, in case that they do not agree
with the funds’ investment objectives and/or are not willing
to incur potential costs of applying ethical standards (Clark
2004; Sandberg et al. 2014).9 They are rather ‘‘locked in’’
the funds and thus, they inevitably bear any potential costs
of ethically motivated exclusionary screening. As the
ultimate beneficiaries of these funds comprise both the
state’s current population as well as future generations
(Bengtsson 2008a, b), reaching a consensus on one ethical
perspective shared by all beneficiaries is rendered difficult,
5 The only exception is an internal study by one of the Swedish
national pension funds themselves. As stated in Sandberg et al. (2014,
footnote on page 66), AP7 conducted an internal inquiry into the
performance implications of its exclusionary screening practices. The
results of this analysis suggest that the screened fund carried a
marginally higher risk than a hypothetical unscreened portfolio, but
did not show any significant difference in returns.
6 Information on the (relative) equity performance of GPFG can be
obtained via the following homepage: https://www.nbim.no/en/
transparency/reports/2015/performance-and-risk-2015/.
7 The first four AP-funds do not provide return figures on their equity
performance relative to the benchmark. The absolute equity returns
for AP1 over 2011–2015 is 6.9 % per annum, for AP2 11.1 % per
annum, for AP3 13 % per annum and for AP4 10.7 % per annum,
respectively. Compared to the 5-year return on the MSCI All Country
World index which amounts to 7.3 % per annum, all but the AP1 fund
outperformed this benchmark. AP7’s equity portfolio earned an
absolute return of 17.3 % per annum over the years 2010–2014,
which represents an average return of -0.2 % in excess of its
benchmark. Information on the AP-funds’ equity performance is
taken from the funds’ annual reports which are available via the
following homepages: for AP1 http://www.ap1.se/en/Financial-infor
mation-and-press/Reports/ , for AP2 http://www.ap2.se/en/Financial-
information/financial-reports/ , for AP3 http://www.ap3.se/sites/eng
lish/financial_reports/Pages/default.aspx , for AP4 http://www.ap4.se/
en/financial-reports-and-press/reports/ , for AP7 https://www.ap7.se/
globalassets/kiidar/kiid-ap7-aktiefond-2015-06-23.pdf.
8 While AP7 focuses only on exclusionary screening, AP1, AP2, AP3
and AP4 combine exclusionary screening with engagement and only
exclude a company after engagement has proven unsuccessful.
9 This point is also explicitly highlighted by the Graver Committee,
an expert committee that has been appointed by the Norwegian
Government to define ethical guidelines for GPFG, as ‘‘a defining
characteristic of the Fund…that a substantial proportion of those on
whose behalf the Fund is managed cannot choose its manager’’. The
English version of the Report from the Graver Committee is available
online: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/Report-on-ethical-
guidelines/id420232/.
A. G. F. Hoepner, L. Schopohl
123
if not impossible.10 To overcome this challenge and to
assure a broad basis of support for their SRI decisions, both
the Norwegian GPFG and the Swedish AP-funds decided
to rely on national law and international standards to set out
a minimum of ethical norms that they expect all the
companies that they hold to abide to. The latter standards
comprise the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines
for Corporate Governance and for Multinational Enter-
prises, labour standards set out by the International Labour
Organization, as well as conventions that ban particular
controversial weapons (Richardson 2011; Sandberg et al.
2014; Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2015).11 Using this
principle of finding the lowest common ethical factor,
funds sought to account for their ethical obligation as
public asset owners while at the same time minimising the
financial impact to the beneficiaries of applying these
ethical standards (Sandberg et al. 2014).
Performance Effects of Exclusionary Screening
Besides the literature on Scandinavian public asset owners,
our study also contributes to the vast literature on the per-
formance impact of exclusionary screening. Arguably, the
most prominent study in this stream of the literature is by
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). In their study, the authors find
that investing in 156 U.S. companies that operate in sectors
related to alcohol, gambling and tobacco—the so-called
triumvirate of sin—over the period 1965–2006 leads to a
positive abnormal return relative to industry-comparable
stocks. Many studies have since attempted to confirm or
disprove the original results by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)
and have extended the original set of screens to reflect a
broader range of societal norms. For instance, studies by
Adler and Kritzman (2008), Durand et al. (2013a, b) and
Trinks and Scholtens (2015) find support for an outperfor-
mance of sin stocks in the U.S. markets, Salaber (2013) for a
European stock universe, Visaltanachoti et al. (2009) for
China and Hong Kong, and Fabozzi et al. (2008) for a set of
21 global equity markets, respectively. However, there is
also a considerable body of research that finds no or only an
insignificant outperformance of sin stocks. For instance,
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) and Statman and Glushkov
(2009) find a positive but insignificant abnormal return,
when applying six common sin screens to a U.S. stock uni-
verse over a 14-year and 16-year period, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, Lobe and Walksha¨usl (2011) and Adamsson and
Hoepner (2015), looking at a global and U.S. set of sin
companies, conclude that the performance of these stocks
does not significantly differ from benchmark returns. In
addition, several studies find that the extent to which inves-
tors shun sin stocks significantly varies across markets and
that markets with more restrictive social norms show a
stronger ‘‘sin’’ effect (e.g. Salaber 2013; Fauver and
McDonald 2014; Liu et al. 2014; Adamsson and Hoepner
2015).12 One aspect that the above studies have in common is
that they test the performance implications of exclusionary
screening by applying screening criteria (e.g. based on
industry classifications) to a predefined investment universe.
Thus, they construct theoretical, and in a sense ‘‘fictive’’,
portfolios of excluded companies. ‘‘Fictive’’ as it is not clear
whether any real-world investor actually applies these exact
screens. While this approach allows dissecting the ‘‘sin’’
impact on performance, it has been criticised for neglecting
real-world investment restrictions. In particular, Adamsson
and Hoepner (2015) and Hoepner and Zeume (2014) argue
that the significant outperformance of ‘‘sin’’ stocks found in
large parts of the literature may disappear, once restricting
the investment universe to stocks that are liquid and large
enough to qualify as suitable investments for institutional
investors.
A stream of the literature that overcomes this criticism
comprises studies that analyse the performance of SRI
mutual funds that apply exclusionary screens (Barnett and
Salomon 2006; Renneboog et al. 2008b; Lee et al. 2010;
Renneboog et al. 2011; Humphrey and Lee 2011; Capelle-
Blancard and Monjon 2014; Humphrey and Tan 2014). In
10 In the Report from the Graver Committee it explicitly says that
‘‘there is no consensus on one particular uniform ethical perspective’’.
See also Richardson (2011) for a further discussion of this issue.
11 See for example the statement by the Ethical Council of AP1, AP2,
AP3 and AP4: ‘‘The Swedish Government’s core values…find
expression in those international conventions that Sweden has signed,
which include conventions on the environment, human rights, labour
law, corruption and inhumane weapons, as well as through the support
given to initiatives such as the United Nations Global Compact and
OECD guidelines for multinational companies, in addition to
Sweden’s own stance on international public law issues. In tandem
with the Swedish Government’s value system, international conven-
tions constitute essential instruments for the Ethical Council in its
efforts to ensure the AP Funds satisfactorily take into account
environmental issues and ethical dimensions in their work’’. The
statement is available online: http://etikradet.se/etikradets-arbete/
vardegrund/?lang=en. Similar references for the GPFG can be
found in the Graver Report on Ethical Guidelines and in the Report to
the Storting (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2016).
12 Durand et al. (2013b) find that the institutional investors have
lower holdings in sin stocks in markets that are culturally closer to the
U.S. (i.e. Australia, New Zealand) than they do in markets with a
larger cultural distance to the U.S. (i.e. Japan, South Korea). Salaber
(2013) concludes that sin stocks earn higher returns in markets with a
higher share of Protestant population, compared to Catholic orienta-
tions, while Liu et al. (2014) find a lower institutional ownership of
sin stocks in regions with a higher share of Protestants. According to
Fauver and McDonald (2014), sin stocks have a lower equity
valuation in markets that consider these stocks more controversial,
and vice versa. Adamsson and Hoepner (2015) map countries
according to different cultural dimensions and find returns for sin
stocks to differ across markets, although most of these differences are
statistically insignificant.
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contrast to the ‘‘sin’’ studies, the mutual funds literature does
not analyse the performance of the excluded companies but it
instead looks at the returns of the funds applying the exclu-
sionary screens. While a large part of the literature concludes
that screening mutual funds do not generally perform dif-
ferently from their conventional peers (e.g. Lee et al. 2010;
Humphrey and Lee 2011; Humphrey and Tan 2014), several
studies show that the relation between screening and per-
formance might be more complex and depends on several
fund-specific factors. For instance, Barnett and Salomon
(2006), Renneboog et al. (2008b), Lee et al. (2010) and
Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) find that the screening-
performance relation depends both on the type of screens and
the fund’s screening intensity, as measured by the number of
screens applied. In addition, Humphrey and Lee (2011) find
that exclusionary screening can impact the risk characteris-
tics of the funds. However, these studies come with their own
methodological restrictions. As Humphrey and Tan (2014)
point out, SRI mutual funds are very heterogeneous and
might apply other SRI approaches or forms of active man-
agement. Thus, studying returns at the fund level does not
allow distinguishing the performance contribution of the
ethical screens from other fund-specific effects such as
managerial skill.
While the review of the considerable body of literature on
exclusionary screening might suggest that the performance
impact of exclusionary screening is already well understood,
we argue that the literature has predominantly focused on
certain aspects of this problem while leaving others still
mainly unexplored. To illustrate, when categorising the
above studies based on the type of exclusionary screens, we
find that most studies cover sector-based exclusions (e.g.
Adler and Kritzman 2008; Fabozzi et al. 2008; Hong and
Kacperczyk 2009; Trinks and Scholtens 2015; Salaber 2013;
Humphrey and Tan 2014; Adamsson and Hoepner 2015),
while currently three studies explicitly address norm-based
screening (Blanc and Cozic 2012; Meller and Husson-Traore
2013; Capelle-Blancard and Monjon 2014). Thus, there is a
clear need for further research on the performance impact of
norm-based screening. In addition, none of the studies
focuses on the performance implications of exclusionary
screening by investors other than mutual funds, although the
previous section has established that public asset owners are
especially susceptible to public pressures to balance their
ethical and financial objectives.
Research Questions and Hypotheses Development
The literature review highlights the ambiguous findings of
the prior literature regarding the performance effects of
exclusionary screening as well as the lack of research on
exclusionary screening by public asset owners in general and
on norm-based screening in particular. Given the special role
of these funds within their state’s society, shedding light on
these unexplored topics is not only of relevance to the funds
themselves but also to other global market participants,
policy makers and the Norwegian and Swedish society. In
our study we aim to fill these gaps by asking:
RQ1 What are the performance implications of exclu-
sionary screening by the GPFG and the AP-funds?
Turning to the previous studies, we may generally
expect three performance effects of applying these screens.
H1a The exclusion portfolios outperform the market.
The hypothesis of a significant outperformance of
excluded ‘‘unethical’’ companies is mainly promoted by
the early parts of the literature, especially the ‘‘sin stock’’
studies (Adler and Kritzman 2008; Fabozzi et al. 2008;
Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). Relying on Merton’s (1987)
incomplete information model and related arguments of
segmented capital markets (Derwall et al. 2011), these
studies argue that norm-constrained investors such as
pension funds and university endowment funds shun con-
troversial stocks. This leads to limited risk sharing among
those investors that hold the controversial companies and
as a consequence, investors require higher returns for
holding the stock. In addition, Fabozzi et al. (2008) argue
that it is costly to implement and uphold social and envi-
ronmental standards and hence compliance with these
norms should decrease firm’s profits. Especially if the cost
of complying with the norms is higher than the costs of
breaking the standards (e.g. litigation risks from being
caught, reputational costs), non-compliant companies are
expected to show higher future profits and cash flows. The
asset pricing implications of these effects are formalised in
Heinkel et al. (2001) who develop a theoretical model of
the impact of exclusionary ethical investing on corporate
behaviour in a risk-averse equilibrium setting. The authors
conclude that the shunned firms should earn a positive
abnormal return relative to the market, while ‘‘acceptable’’
firms are expected to underperform. However, it is
important to note that this argument is based on the idea of
a temporary undervaluation of the shunned stocks which is
eventually corrected and thereby generates a positive
abnormal return for investors holding the stocks.
H1b The exclusion portfolios underperform the market.
In contrast, the proponents of an underperformance
effect of exclusion portfolios argue that the unethical
companies are overvalued. They postulate that the market
does not fully incorporate the risks that are associated with
unethical corporate practices and breaches of international
norms. For instance, Barnett and Salomon (2006) and
Petersen and Vredenburg (2009) point out that these firms
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are exposed to risks of negative government and/or social
actions such as litigation risk, penalties and increased
opposition from communities and local authorities
regarding future investment projects. In addition, unethical
companies could face reputational costs that might lead to
a loss in customer and client loyalty and thus lower rev-
enues or to higher employee turnover and a loss in com-
petitiveness in corporate hiring (Barnett and Salomon
2006). Finally, the involvement in scandals could also
signal bad managerial talent, exposing investors to greater
management risk (Renneboog et al. 2008b). However, the
GPFG and AP-funds only exclude a company after the
breach has occurred and/or after the involvement in the
unethical business practice has become public knowledge.
Thus, for these risks to affect the funds’ portfolio perfor-
mance two potential channels are possible. On the one
hand, the potential risks associated with the unethical
business practices are not being properly priced in the
market at the time of divestment. Thus, even if the funds
only divest from the company after the incident has
occurred they might still avoid some of the stock price
decline as the market slowly learns about the true costs of
the unethical practices. On the other hand, investors could
regard past breaches of norms as a predictor of future
incidents. Again assuming that the market does not account
for this increased risk exposure, divestment could shield
the funds from the negative financial consequences of
future incidents. Considering that the GPFG and the AP-
funds aim to only exclude companies that have a high risk
of future breaches and that show no willingness to change
their corporate practices (Richardson 2011; Sandberg et al.
2014), the latter channel may explain a potential under-
performance of their excluded companies.
H1c The exclusion portfolios do not show significant
performance differences compared to the market.
Finally, one might expect no significant performance
effect of exclusionary screening (see e.g. the assessment of
Kurtz 2005, based on a review of the long-term performance
of social indices and SRI mutual funds). For one thing, the
two previous hypotheses rely on the assumption of (partial)
market inefficiency. However, if the market was efficient, it
would instantaneously and correctly adjust the market price
of stocks to reflect all material risks upon disclosure of the
incident. Thus, divesting from the company after the incident
has occurred should not lead to any abnormal performance
difference relative to the market. In addition, one could
expect an insignificant performance impact of exclusions if
the funds consciously balance the financial and ethical
expectations of their beneficiaries by only excluding com-
panies if the exclusion does not harm fund performance.
However, this line of argument relies on several critical
assumptions. First, the funds would need to select exclusion
targets from a set of unethical companies. This assumption is
quite realistic as time and resource constraints provide a
natural limit to the number of companies that the fund can
investigate and engage with (Clark and Monk 2010). In
addition, the argument assumes an implicit prioritisation of
the financial objectives over the ethical objectives, which, as
will be discussed in the Conclusion, cannot be regarded as
given. And finally, the argument implies that the funds are
able to correctly evaluate the future performance effect of
their exclusion decisions.
So far, we have regarded the excluded companies as one
homogeneous group. However, prior research indicates that
performance effects may differ depending on the nature of
the exclusionary screen (Barnett and Salomon 2006; Ren-
neboog et al. 2008b; Capelle-Blancard and Monjon 2014;
Trinks and Scholtens 2015). Looking at the case of the GPFG
and the AP-funds, we can differentiate between sector-based
exclusions and norm-based exclusions. Based on these dif-
ferences, we pose a subordinate research question:
RQ2 Do the performance implications of exclusionary
screening differ across different types of screens, especially
regarding sector-based versus norm-based screens?
Norm-based exclusions are naturally not restricted to a
certain business sector but theoretically apply to all com-
panies in the portfolio. In addition, the latter practices can
be changed by the company without changing the nature of
the operations whereas a company had to sell (part of) its
operations to remove the basis for a sector-based exclusion.
These differences have the effect that companies excluded
due to norm-based screens are exposed to the previously
discussed sources of risks to varying degrees. For instance,
it can be argued that investors applying sector-based
exclusions are more strongly exposed to the limited-risk-
sharing-problem due to market segmentation and less
exposed to companies’ ‘‘hidden’’ risks. As limited risk
sharing is associated with an outperformance of excluded
companies due to limited diversification opportunities
across investors, we expect sector-based exclusions to
generate superior performance.
H2a Exclusion portfolios based on sector-based screens
outperform the market.
H2b Exclusion portfolios based on norm-based screens
underperform the market.
To illustrate, for market participants it is easier to
identify what operations a company runs as to assess the
way that the business is operated. This makes market
segmentation based on sectors more feasible than based on
business practices. In addition, while for most norm-based
exclusions a comparable substitute from the same industry
is available, adequate substitution is often not possible
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when excluding an entire business sector. Finally, while the
business sector is a more permanent feature of a company,
the way that the company runs its business, i.e. in a
responsible or irresponsible manner, can be altered more
easily. Hence, in conclusion, the risk from market seg-
mentation and limited risk sharing is more likely to
materialise for sector-based exclusions while it is more
easily diversifiable and thus less likely to be compensated
in case of norm-based exclusions.
On the other hand, companies that are excluded due to
norm-based screens are more likely to bear ‘‘hidden’’ risks
that are not correctly priced by the market than those
excluded due to sector-based screens. These ‘‘hidden’’ or
mispriced risks associated with unethical behaviour imply
that norm-based exclusions are more likely to generate
inferior financial performance.
For one thing, breaches of norms and unethical business
practices are less visible to the market, especially since the
company has a high incentive to obscure the true extent of the
incident. This is evidenced by the literature that assesses the
impact of announcements of negative human and labour
rights and environmental incidents on firm value (e.g. Kap-
pel et al. 2009, for human rights issues; Klassen and
McLaughlin 1996; Dasgupta and Laplante 2001; Gupta and
Goldar 2005; Konar and Cohen 1997; Flammer 2013, for
environmental violations; Hirsh and Cha 2015, for labour
rights issues; and Amer 2015, for issues related to non-
conformity with the UN Global Compact). These studies
predominantly find a loss in firm value around the
announcement date indicating that the market has previously
mispriced the risk of the company. Depending on the time-
liness of the divestment and the speed of market adjustment,
a divestment from these companies could protect the GPFG
and the AP-funds at least partially against the downward
price adjustment caused by the incident or, alternatively,
safeguard the funds against the negative return consequences
of potential future breaches of norms. In comparison, such
misevaluations of the risk involved with operating in a par-
ticular sector are less likely, given the often long history of
operations of these sectors and the fact that the sector is not
an unexpected element of a company. Thus, to conclude
market segmentation risks that could result in a temporary
undervaluation are more likely to be found for sector-based
exclusions while companies excluded due to norm-based
screens are more prone to overvaluation related to hidden
risks.
Data and Methodology
The following sections introduce the data and methodology
used to test the performance implications of the exclusion
decisions of the GPFG and the AP-funds.
Data and Portfolio Construction
Our main data source are the exclusion lists published by
the GPFG and the AP-funds. The exclusion decisions of
these funds are the outcome of a systematic review of
companies accused of serious norm violations and other
business practices that are in conflict with the ethical
standards set out by the funds. These reviews resemble a
‘‘quasi-legal’’ process that assesses the seriousness and
extent of the violation as well as the willingness of the
company to change its practices. It also allows the com-
panies to respond to the allegations made against them
before any exclusion takes place (Richardson 2011).
Regarding the scope of the exclusions and in particular the
asset classes involved, the AP-funds and the GPFG are
generally required to divest from any form of investment in
the unethical company, including listed equities, fixed
income and other forms of investment such as real-estate.13
In line with the previous literature, this study particularly
focuses on the effect of divestment from listed equities.14
In the case of the GPFG, a separate body, the Council for
Ethics, reviews the allegations made against companies and
issues recommendations regarding the exclusion, or
otherwise, of a company. Up until the end of 2014 the
Ministry of Finance made the final decision on a case-by-
case basis, while from 2015 onwards the Norges Bank has
been assigned the task of decision making on the obser-
vation and exclusion of companies (Norwegian Ministry of
Finance 2016). The Swedish AP-funds consist of the five
separate funds AP1, AP2, AP3, AP4 and AP6—which
represent the income-based pension—and the fund AP7—
13 While the funds do not clearly state the scope of their exclusion
decisions there is considerable evidence that leads us to believe that
the entire portfolio is concerned. For the case of GPFG, in the ethical
guidelines that stipulate the fund’s exclusion criteria it says that ‘‘the
guidelines cover investments in the Fund’s equity and fixed-income
portfolios, as well as instruments in the Fund’s real-estate portfolio
issued by companies listed on a regulated market’’. In addition, GPFG
specifies in its latest RI report for the Principles for Responsible
Investment (PRI) that its SRI policies, including its screening/
exclusion policy, cover all assets under management (AUM). The AP-
funds state in their RI Reports that their SRI policies including
screening/exclusion policy comprise their entire AUM (for the case of
AP1, AP2, AP7) or the majority of their AUM (for AP3 and AP4).
The RI reports for the funds can be obtained online: https://www.
unpri.org/signatory-directory/ Furthermore, the ethical council that
recommends exclusions for AP1–AP4 states on its homepage that
‘‘the recommendation for exclusion also applies to listed subsidiaries’’
http://etikradet.se/etikradets-arbete/reaktiva-dialoger-vid-krankning/
rekommenderade-uteslutningar/?lang=en.
14 To the best of our knowledge, no empirical study has, so far,
analysed the performance implications of exclusionary screening for
asset classes other than public equity. While representing an
interesting avenue for future research, an extension of the analysis
of the performance implications of GPFG’s and the AP-funds’
exclusions beyond public equity is empirically beyond the scope of
this study.
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which serves as the government default fund for the pre-
mium reserve system.15 AP1, AP2, AP3 and AP4 follow a
similar exclusion process as GPFG in terms of the exclu-
sion process and prior engagement with the company. At
the beginning of 2007 the four funds established a joint
Ethical Council to coordinate the analysis of the environ-
mental and ethical compliance of their holdings. The pur-
pose of this collaboration is to combine the four funds’
resources and votes for greater leverage in influencing
companies and to increase the efficiency of the engage-
ments. Although the Ethical Council only issues recom-
mendations and the four funds have the final say regarding
the exclusion decisions, AP1, AP2, AP3 and AP4 have all
been following the Council’s recommendations. Due to
their identical exclusions and exclusion policy, we regard
AP1, AP2, AP3 and AP4 as one joint fund for the sake of
this study, though we acknowledge that they might deviate
from each other in terms of investment strategy in other
respects.16 Unlike GFPG and AP1-4, AP7 does not indi-
vidually disclose each exclusion decision, but it provides a
list of its current exclusions in its annual reports (Du Rietz
2016; Bengtsson 2008b). In addition, while it states the
reason for exclusion, AP7 does not provide the exact
exclusion date. Another difference between AP7’s and the
other funds’ exclusion approach is that it does not rely on
prior engagement with the accused company but proceeds
straight to exclusion. AP6 does not publish any exclusion
list and is thus not considered in this study.
For our study, we collect the entire history of the
divestments, including the company name, the reason for
exclusion and, if available, the exact date of exclusion, for
GPFG, AP7 and the joint exclusions of AP1, AP2, AP3 and
AP4. Such detailed information on funds’ exclusion deci-
sions is hardly available for other (private) market partic-
ipants and thus allows us to gain unique insights into the
trends in exclusionary screening over time. For instance,
studies analysing exclusionary screening by SRI mutual
funds do not have information on the excluded companies
or on the precise reason for exclusion. For GPFG and the
joint exclusions of AP1, AP2, AP3 and AP4, we start from
the most recent exclusion list, published on the funds’
websites, and reconstruct the lists back in time based on the
funds’ announcements of past exclusions and re-inclusions.
In the few cases, where no precise exclusion date is pro-
vided, we use the announcement date of the exclusion
instead. For AP7 we rely on the list of excluded companies
published in its past annual reports. Our sample starts at the
end of 2001 when AP7 publishes its first exclusion list in
its annual report. GPFG undertook its first divestment in
2002, while for the case of AP1 to AP4 we document the
first exclusion in 2006. We account for all subsequent
exclusions and re-inclusions until the end of 2015.
In a next step, we construct portfolios that contain the
companies that are being excluded by the funds at any
point in time. To do so, we match the exclusion lists
published by the funds with the stock price data of the
excluded stocks. We obtain monthly stock price data for
the excluded companies from Datastream. In line with
related studies by Fabozzi et al. (2008), Lobe and Walk-
sha¨usl (2011), Salaber (2013) and Trinks and Scholtens
(2015), we use Datastream’s Total Return Index which
reflects a stock’s theoretical growth in value assuming all
dividends are re-invested.17 For GPFG and AP1-4, we add
a company to the portfolio of excluded companies, based
on the stated date of exclusion from the fund’s portfolio.
We remove a company from the portfolio of excluded
companies, once the re-inclusion is announced. Lacking
the exact date of AP7’s exclusions, we assume that the
exclusion list at the end of the year forms the basis for
AP7’s exclusion portfolio of the following year. We update
AP7’s portfolio on a year-by-year basis, using the latest
annual report. We require a company to appear on AP7’s
exclusion list in two consecutive years as we must assume
that a company which appears on one year’s exclusion list
but is absent from next year’s list could have been re-
included by AP7 at any point in time throughout the con-
secutive year.
For each of the three fund groups, we construct monthly
continuously compounded returns for both equal- and
value-weighted portfolios. The equal-weighted portfolios
assign equal weight to each company so that the return of
the portfolio represents the simple average of the individual
stock returns. The equal-weighted return is calculated as
the natural logarithm of the average return of all companies
excluded at the end of a particular month, which can be
expressed in the following way:








where rew,t is the equal-weighted, continuously com-
pounded portfolio return over month t, Pi,t is the stock price
of company i at the end of month t, Pi,t-1 is that company’s
15 The premium reserve system relates to the part of the public
pension money that savers can invest themselves.
16 The only deviation in the four funds’ exclusion portfolios relates to
a case prior to the establishment of the joint Ethical Council. In
particular, AP2 excluded Wal-Mart at an earlier time than AP1, AP3
and AP4. When constructing the portfolio of excluded companies we
use the time of AP2’s exclusion as the exclusion date.
17 Datastream is a database for financial and economic research data
from Thomson Reuters. It is widely used in empirical studies of
socially responsible investment and in the fields of empirical finance
more generally. While the use of this database is not undisputed (see
e.g. the analysis of Ince and Porter 2006, regarding potential data
errors in Datastream), the data issues pointed out in the prior literature
are unlikely to affect our results.
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stock price at the end of the previous month t-1, and the
total number of companies in the portfolio equals k.
In comparison, value-weighted returns account for the
weight of a company in the equity market by attaching a
higher (lower) weight to companies that represent a larger
(smaller) share of the overall equity market. They are
computed in a similar fashion to equal-weighted returns but
instead of giving each company the same weight in the
portfolio, a company’s return is weighted by its market










where rew,t is the value-weighted, continuously com-
pounded portfolio return over month t and MCapi;t1 is the
market capitalisation of company i at the end of month
t-1.
Using value-weighted portfolio returns is not only in
line with the related literature (e.g. Statman and Glushkov
2009; Lobe and Walksha¨usl 2011; Salaber 2013; Adams-
son and Hoepner 2015; Trinks and Scholtens 2015), it also
better reflects the investment realities at the funds we
study. For one thing, these investors are mainly passive
investors and thus the weights of the companies in their
portfolios closely follow the market weights (e.g. Cham-
bers et al. 2012). In addition, their performance is usually
benchmarked against (value-weighted) market indices, as
we will discuss in more detail in the following sec-
tion. Although less practically relevant, equal-weighted
portfolio returns have been employed as the sole return
measure in the early literature (e.g. Fabozzi et al. 2008;
Hong and Kacperczyk 2009) and using them allows us to
compare our results to these early findings.
Methodology
To test the performance implications of applying exclu-
sionary screens, we employ two standard asset pricing
models. Firstly, we estimate a Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) with the market risk premium corresponding to
the excess return of the fund’s performance benchmark.
Secondly, we test the performance effects in the framework
of a Four-Factor model, where we add a size, value and
momentum factor to the market factor (Fama and French
1993; Carhart 1997). Using these models is not only
standard in the literature and in line with related studies
(e.g. Statman and Glushkov 2009; Humphrey and Lee
2011; Humphrey and Tan 2014; Trinks and Scholtens
2015; Adamsson and Hoepner 2015), it also corresponds to
the way that these funds are managed. For instance,
Chambers et al. (2012) point out that GPFG almost
exclusively relies on publicly traded securities, while being
constrained to very low deviations from the benchmark
portfolio (see also Hoepner et al. 2013, discussing this
issue for pension funds in general). Thus, models like the
CAPM and the extended factor models which measure
performance relative to a benchmark, best capture this
management style.
As the funds invest in a global, well-diversified portfo-
lio, the market benchmark used in the models needs to be a
global, diversified index. The MSCI All Country World
index reflects these features and consequently it is widely
used in academic research (e.g. Trinks and Scholtens
2015). In addition, AP7 explicitly employs the index as its
benchmark for global equities.18 The CAPM model can be
expressed in the following way:
rp;t  rf ;t1 ¼ /p þ bp rm;t  rf ;t1
 þ up;t; ð3Þ
where rp,t is the continuously compounded return on either
the equal-weighted or value-weighted exclusion portfolio
p over month t, rf,t-1 is the continuously compounded
3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate at the end of month t-1
which serves as a proxy for the risk-free rate applicable for
month t,19 rm,t is the continuously compounded return on
the MSCI All Country World index which represents the
market benchmark portfolio, /p is Jensen’s alpha mea-
suring the abnormal return of portfolio p relative to the
market, bp is the market beta of portfolio p capturing the
systematic risk exposure of the portfolio and up,t is the
independent disturbance term.
The CAPM model assumes that the only priced risk is a
security’s exposure to the systematic market risk. However,
since its development numerous studies have found that
other factors besides the market risk are priced in the cross-
section of returns. Among the well-documented factors are
the premium for small stocks and value stocks, i.e. stocks
with high book-to-market ratios, (e.g. Fama and French
1993) and the outperformance of past winning stocks over
past losing stocks, called the momentum effect (Carhart
18 For further information on AP7’s evaluation of equity investments
see the fund’s homepage: http://www.ap7.se/en/About-AP7/About-
us/Our-approach/Equity-investments/ . AP1–4 do not state any offi-
cial benchmark index. Their performance seems to be mainly mea-
sured in relation to each other and based on the level of their annual
operating costs (Severinson and Stewart 2012). GPFG uses an indi-
vidually customised equity index which can be downloaded from
GPFG’s homepage. However, the MSCI All Country World index
and the returns of GPFG’s strategic index have a correlation of
99.49 % and replacing the MSCI index with GPFG’s strategic index
does not significantly change our results. The results of the latter
analysis are available from the authors upon request.
19 We transform the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate into a
continuously compounded risk-free rate using the following formula:
Rf ;t;1m ¼ ln 1 þ SRf ;t;3m  312
 1
3, where Rf ;t;1m is the continuously
compounded 1-month rate and SRf ;t;3m is the stated 3-month Treasury
rate.
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1997). Previous literature has found that companies that act
in a socially responsible manner show a different exposure
to these size, value and momentum factors than socially
irresponsible firms (e.g. Bauer et al. 2005; Galema et al.
2008; Statman and Glushkov 2009). Thus, to make sure
that any performance difference between the excluded
companies and the benchmark is not purely driven by
different loadings on these risk factors, we add these three
factors to our market model, which can now be expressed
in the following way:
ri;t  rf ;t1 ¼ /i þbi rm;t  rf ;t1
 þ ciSMBt
þ diHMLt þ uiWMLt þ ui;t; ð4Þ
where SMBt (small minus big) is the global size factor
calculated as the difference in return of the stocks in the
lower half of a market capitalisation ranked global stock
universe and the stocks in the upper half of the same uni-
verse, HMLt (high minus low) is the global value factor
calculated as the return difference of the top 30 % of global
stocks ranked by book-to-market ratio and the bottom
30 % of these stocks ranked by book-to-market ratio, and
the WMLt (winner minus loser) is the global momentum
factor calculated as the return difference between the top
30 % and the bottom 30 % of stocks ranked by previous
12 months returns.20
Results
This section presents and discusses the results on the per-
formance impact of exclusionary screening. We first
describe the composition of the exclusion lists of the funds
in our sample, before we present the estimation results of
the factor models.21
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 provides an overview of the cross-
sectional characteristics of the exclusion lists of the GPFG,
AP1-4 and AP7, based on the composition of their exclu-
sion lists at the end of a year. Several interesting differ-
ences across the funds can be observed. Firstly, the three
fund groups seem to differ with respect to the extent to
which they apply exclusionary screens. While AP1 to AP4
only exclude a total of 20 companies over the sample
period with an average of just over 14 exclusions per year,
the GPFG’s exclusion lists comprise an average of about
49 companies per year representing 74 different firms.
Although AP7’s annual exclusion list, on average, only
consists of less than 43 companies, the fund has excluded a
total of 152 different companies over the entire sample
period. Comparing the number of exclusions to the total
number of companies that these funds invest in, the extent
of exclusionary screening appears small. To illustrate, the
GPFG currently holds around 9000 companies while AP7’s
equity investment universe spans around 2500 different
companies.22 Thus, the excluded companies only make out
around 0.7 % (i.e. 63/9000) of the total number of holdings
for GPFG and 1.8 % (i.e. 46/2500) for AP7, respectively.
Similarly, the share of excluded companies to total number
of holdings is about 0.8 % (i.e. 20/2500) for AP2, 0.7 %
(i.e. 20/3000) for AP3, and 1.2 % (i.e. 20/1700) for AP4.23
The only exception is AP1. From 2014 onwards, AP1 has
been shifting its equity strategy from holding a broad
universe of global and domestic stocks to a strategy of
concentrated ownership and has reduced its equity holdings
from about 3000 to 600 companies.24 However, the 20
companies excluded in 2015 still only represent a small
fraction of the total number of holdings of just over 6 %.
These figures are also in line with the number of excluded
companies typically found in the mutual fund industry. For
instance, Humphrey and Tan (2014) simulate exclusion
portfolios of a typical mutual fund and their portfolios
comprise an average of 60 exclusions. In addition, Blanc
and Cozic (2012) reviewing the norm-based exclusions of
32 European asset owners and asset managers find that
these investors exclude on average 26 companies based on
violations of international norms and association to con-
troversial weapons.
Secondly, the funds in our sample do not only seem to
differ in their tendency to exclude companies but also in
their likelihood to re-include companies. Re-inclusions are
cases where the fund revokes its exclusion decision and the
company re-enters the fund’s investment portfolio. These
re-inclusions are usually a result of the periodic reviews
undertaken by the funds to check whether the reason for
exclusion still exists. For GPFG, we document a total of
eight re-inclusions, while we find no re-inclusion
20 The data for the global size, value and momentum factors are
obtained from Kenneth French’s online data library: http://mba.tuck.
dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
21 All estimations and empirical tests that are presented in this study
have been performed using the statistical software package Stata.
22 Details about GPFG’s assets and holdings can be obtained from its
homepage: http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/. AP7 states that its
equity investments follow the MSCI All Country World Index which
currently covers around 2500 companies: https://www.ap7.se/en/
About-AP7/About-us/Our-approach/Equity-investments/.
23 The most recent equity portfolios of AP2, AP3 and AP4 can be




24 See AP1’s 2014 Ownership report on page 10, which is available
online: http://www.ap1.se/en/Financial-information-and-press/Topical/.
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announcements for AP1-4. AP7 seems to frequently re-
include companies with a total of 99 cases of re-inclusions
between 2001 and 2015.25 In general, AP7’s exclusion lists
show far higher variation across years, while GPFG’s and
Table 1 Summary statistics of the exclusion lists
Total exclusions Total re-inclusions Number of excluded companies (per year) Average time of exclusion (in years)
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Panel A: cross-sectional characteristics
GPFG 74 8 49.03 1 63 7.93 1 14
AP1–4 20 – 13.59 1 20 7.05 1 9
AP7 152 99 42.53 19 54 5.71 1 15
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Panel B: exclusion lists at year end
Exclusions by all funds 26 40 35 20 40 45 56 97 109 115 115 118 121 125 129
Thereof excluded by
GPFG – 1 1 1 13 19 26 30 48 49 53 54 57 59 63
AP1–4 – – – – – 2 3 13 13 14 14 14 17 19 20
AP7 26 39 34 19 27 24 27 54 48 52 48 50 47 47 46
Thereof excluded due to
Environmental issues 8 10 7 9 8 4 12 20 17 17 15 15 19 20 24
Human rights issues 14 17 17 7 15 15 17 21 18 26 25 29 25 30 30
Labour rights issues 9 18 15 6 8 8 7 8 8 7 8 7 7 6 7
Controversial weapons 1 2 3 2 13 20 23 52 52 53 53 53 52 51 50
Tobacco – – – – – – – – 17 17 19 19 21 21 21
Thereof located in the following regions
North America 14 13 8 7 22 25 24 43 47 49 46 47 53 56 56
Europe 5 9 7 4 9 12 10 20 23 24 26 26 23 22 22
Asia 5 15 16 7 8 4 16 26 31 35 34 34 33 35 39
Australia 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 6 6 4 4 4 5 5 5
Africa – – – – – – 2 1 – – – – – – –
South America 1 1 2 1 – 2 2 2 3 4 6 8 8 8 8
Thereof operating in the following industries
Aerospace and defence – 2 3 2 12 20 21 40 40 40 39 39 37 37 37
Chemicals related 2 3 2 2 3 1 – 2 2 4 4 4 7 9 9
Construction and materials – – – – – – – 1 1 3 5 7 9 10 11
General retailers 3 3 2 1 1 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Industrial metals and mining 2 4 2 1 1 4 8 13 13 11 11 13 14 15 16
Oil and gas related 8 7 5 5 10 8 6 7 3 5 4 5 4 4 4
Tobacco – – – – – – – – 17 17 17 17 18 18 18
Other industries 11 21 21 9 13 7 16 28 27 29 29 27 26 26 28
Panel A provides summary statistics on the cross-sectional characteristics of the exclusion lists of the three fund groups—GPFG, AP1–AP4, and
AP7. The first two columns provide the number of different companies that are excluded from and re-included to the funds over the sample
period 2001–2015. Note that we do not count companies double. The third column provides summary statistics on the number of excluded
companies per fund. The fourth column states the average time (in years) that a company has been on a fund’s exclusion list. Panel B reports the
number of companies that are excluded from the funds at year end. The first row lists the number of exclusions by all funds. The following sets of
rows report the number of exclusions (a) by each fund, (b) by the reason for exclusion (as stated by the fund), (c) by the location of the excluded
company (company’s headquarter), and (d) by the company’s main industry. Note that companies can be excluded due to more than one reason.
All figures are based on the comparison of end-of-year exclusion lists
25 We interpret every case when a company appears on last year’s
exclusion list but is absent on the exclusion list in the consecutive
Footnote 25 continued
year as a re-inclusion of that company, unless the company disap-
peared from the investment universe e.g. due to a merger, bankruptcy
or privatisation.
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AP1-4’s exclusion lists appear more constant over time.
This pattern is confirmed when comparing the average
duration of a company on the funds’ exclusion lists which
is 8 years for GPFG and 7 years for AP1-4, respectively,
while it is less than 6 years for the case of AP7. However,
when comparing these figures across countries one has to
consider that AP1-4 have started their exclusionary
screening considerably later than the other two funds which
biases the average duration of companies on AP1-4’s
exclusion list downwards.
Panel B of Table 1 provides a comparison of the
exclusion lists over time and thus enables us to identify
some interesting patterns in the exclusionary approaches
adopted by the funds. For one thing, we document a
gradually increasing trend in the number of exclusions,
both when aggregating across funds and for each fund
individually. In addition, we find further support that AP7’s
approach towards exclusionary screening differs from that
of the other funds. AP7’s exclusion list already comprises a
comparably high number of 26 companies right from the
beginning of its exclusionary screening in year 2001. In
comparison, GPFG and AP1-4 start off with singular
exclusions of one and two companies, respectively. AP7
also almost gradually increases the number of excluded
companies over time, whereas the exclusion lists of GPFG
and AP1-4 experience wave-like rises in the number of
excluded companies. Although the reasons for these dif-
ferences are unknown, they might relate to AP7 having a
less formalised exclusion process than the other two funds,
such as no separate ethical council, no public justification
of the reasons for exclusion and no prior engagement with
the companies, allowing it greater flexibility in the exclu-
sion decisions.
Panel B of Table 1 also offers a break-down of the
exclusions by reason for exclusion.26 Overall, the compa-
nies in our sample are either excluded due to environ-
mental, human rights or labour rights issues or because
they are associated to the production of controversial
weapons or tobacco. Interestingly, the funds do not exclude
companies due to other reasons frequently studied in the
academic literature such as alcohol, gambling and adult
entertainment (see e.g. the early studies by Adler and
Kritzman 2008; Fabozzi et al. 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk
2009) as well as fossil fuel companies which have recently
become a popular target of divestment campaigns. Thus,
our study contributes to the literature by shedding light on
less well researched areas of exclusionary screening.
Looking at the trends over time, we find that human rights
issues and labour rights issues have been the most fre-
quently applied screens in the early part of the sample,
while controversial weapons and tobacco gained impor-
tance in the later years. In fact, screening for controversial
weapons has been the most frequently applied screen since
2008. Tobacco companies entered the exclusion list in
2009 when GPFG added tobacco to its exclusion criteria. In
contrast, the Swedish funds do not exclude tobacco stocks,
arguing that the manufacture, sale and use of tobacco is not
illegal in Sweden so that tobacco divestment does not have
a legal basis.27
Finally, Panel B of Table 1 allows insights into the
geographical and sectoral distribution of exclusions. Most
of the excluded companies appear to be located in North
America, followed by Asia and Europe. Only few excluded
companies are located in South America, Australia and
Africa. However, while this finding does not imply that the
corporate misconduct must have been committed e.g. in
North America—it can relate to unethical behaviour in
other parts of the world committed by companies head-
quartered in North America—it suggests that unethical
business practices and violations of international norms are
not restricted to the corporate sector of emerging and
developing markets. In fact, they are most frequently
committed by companies from regions which rank highly
on rankings of the quality of governance and the legal
system.28
Regarding the industries that the excluded companies
operate in, the majority of exclusions comprise aerospace
and defence companies, reflecting the popularity of the
controversial weapons screen. The same holds for tobacco
companies which constitute a considerable share of the
exclusion portfolio due to GPFG’s tobacco divestment. In
addition, companies operating in the sectors of construction
& materials as well as industrial metals & mining appear
frequently on the exclusion lists. This finding is in line with
the results obtained by Blanc and Cozic (2012) based on a
comparison of 32 European investors and, according to the
authors, relates to the higher exposure of these sectors to
environmental, social and governance risks. Besides, we do
not find a strong dominance of other sectors. Interestingly,
and in line with Blanc and Cozic (2012), with the exception
of Wal-Mart, the lists do not feature companies from the
mass retailing industry, such as popular warehouse chains,
e-retailers and the food processing industry which have
26 Some companies are excluded due to more than one reason, for
example based on violations of environmental norms and due to
human rights issues. Thus, the individual columns of Table 1 may not
always sum up to the overall number of excluded companies.
27 A position statement of why the funds AP1, AP2, AP3 and AP4 do
not divest from tobacco companies is provided on the homepage of
their ethical council, available online: http://etikradet.se/etikradets-
arbete/positioner/tobak/?lang=en.
28 See for example the latest Rule of Law ranking by the World
Justice Project, available online: http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-
law-around-world.
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been involved in several corporate scandals over the last
years.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the returns of
the exclusion portfolios across funds and thus allows a
preliminary assessment of the performance implications of
the exclusions. Panel A focuses on the entire set of
excluded companies, while Panel B compares returns on
the excluded companies sorted by the different types of
exclusionary screens. Overall, the average returns on the
exclusion portfolios are relatively low and mostly positive.
The highest average monthly return amounts to 1.3 % and
is documented for GPFG’s value-weighted tobacco exclu-
sions. Only three portfolios yield negative average returns,
namely AP1-4’s equal- and value-weighted environmental
exclusions with monthly returns of -4 % and -4.1 %,
respectively, and GPFG’s value-weighted environmental
exclusions with a return of -0.6 %. In addition, we find
that in the majority of cases the equal-weighted portfolios
have slightly higher returns than their value-weighted
equivalents. This finding is in line with the widely docu-
mented ‘‘size’’ effect in stock returns and reflects the
empirical observation that smaller stocks tend to exhibit
higher than average returns (e.g. Fama and French 1993).
As the equal-weighted portfolios give greater weight to the
smaller stocks than value-weighted portfolios, the higher
returns are likely to reflect the different loadings on the size
factor. This finding highlights the importance of using
value-weighted portfolio returns as well as the need to
explicitly control for the size effect in the later estimations.
When comparing the portfolio returns across the type of
exclusionary screens (Table 2, Panel B), we find greater
differences in average portfolio returns than on the aggre-
gate level. This finding provides initial evidence that the
performance implications of ethical screening might differ
across screens and in this sense is in line with the existing
literature (e.g. Renneboog et al. 2008b; Capelle-Blancard
and Monjon 2014; Trinks and Scholtens 2015).
Main Portfolio Performance Results
While the descriptive statistics allow a first assessment of
the performance of the different exclusion portfolios, they
do not account for different exposures to risk. This section
presents the results of measuring the risk-adjusted perfor-
mance of the exclusion portfolios using the CAPM and the
Four-Factor models. We are particularly interested in the
alpha estimates from these regressions as a positive (neg-
ative) and significant alpha estimate indicates that the
exclusion portfolio outperforms (underperforms) relative to
the market. Thus, excluding these companies from the
funds’ investment universe financially hurts (benefits) the
fund. In comparison, if we find no significant performance
difference we conclude that these funds can meet their
ethical standards without sacrificing returns.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the estimation results based
on the CAPM model which accounts for the systematic
market risk of a portfolio. Overall, we only find very weak
evidence of any significant performance effect of applying
exclusionary screens. Out of the six exclusion portfolios,
three portfolios exhibit a positive and significant alpha, of
which two are only significant at the 10 % level. These
include AP7’s equal-weighted and value-weighted exclu-
sion portfolios and GPFG’s equal-weighted exclusions. On
an annualised basis, the abnormal returns on AP7’s
exclusions amount to 5.4 % for the equal-weighted port-
folio and 3.4 % for the value-weighted portfolio. GPFG’s
equal-weighted exclusion portfolio generates an annual
return of 4.4 %. However, due to the low statistical sig-
nificance, especially of the practically more relevant value-
weighted portfolios, it is highly doubtful whether investing
in the excluded companies would have yielded a measur-
able abnormal return. Finally, the exclusion portfolios of
AP1-4 neither out- nor underperform in the CAPM-
framework, independent of the weighting scheme.
The results of the Four-Factor model are presented in
Panel B of Table 3. Having added the additional global risk
factors, we find that only two portfolios significantly out-
perform the benchmark model. AP7’s equal-weighted
portfolio generates a positive and significant abnormal
return of 4.3 % per annum, while AP1-4’s equal-weighted
exclusion portfolio outperforms the benchmark by 6.2 %
per annum. However, in both cases the results are only
weakly statistically significant and the significance is lost
when applying value-weighting to the returns. This finding
is in line with results presented in Statman and Glushkov
(2009) and Adamsson and Hoepner (2015) who find that
the outperformance of shunned stocks is only statistically
significant for equal-weighted portfolios, while the effect
becomes statistically insignificant and economically smal-
ler for value-weighted portfolios.
To conclude, the majority of the results suggests that the
funds are neither significantly hurt nor do they financially
benefit from excluding the stocks from their portfolios
which supports hypothesis H1c of an insignificant perfor-
mance effect of applying exclusionary screening. While we
find no support for H1b and thus a performance enhancing
effect of exclusionary screening, we find very limited
evidence that the excluded companies outperform the
benchmark which is in line with H1a. Overall, our results
confirm findings of the literature on SRI mutual funds,
though using a different methodological approach by
focusing on the returns of the excluded companies instead
of the returns of the screening fund (e.g. Lobe and Walk-
sha¨usl 2011; Humphrey and Lee 2011; Humphrey and Tan
2014). In comparison, our findings are in contrast to the
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studies by Adler and Kritzman (2008), Fabozzi et al.
(2008), Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Durand et al.
(2013b), Salaber (2013), and Trinks and Scholtens (2015)
which, based on an analysis of theoretical portfolios of
unethical companies, conclude that these companies gen-
erate superior financial performance and that, as a conse-
quence, exclusionary screening has a negative performance
impact.
However, our analysis considerably differs from the
above studies in several ways. Firstly, while the exclusionary
screens studied in the previous literature mainly comprise the
traditional sin screens with several additions of other sector-
based screens, the exclusions by the GPFG and the AP-funds
mainly reflect norm-based screening (with the exception of
tobacco for GPFG). As holding companies that violate
international norms may expose investors to different risks
than holding companies that operate in ‘‘sin’’ sectors, we
should not expect that the results of the previous literature
can simply be extended to all forms of exclusionary screens.
We will explore this aspect in more detail in the following
section. Secondly, our analysis differs from the above studies
because we rely on actual exclusions of real-world investors
and analyse the performance effect at the company-level.
This way we prevent our results from being driven by con-
founding factors such as manager skill. And finally, we put
greater emphasis on value-weighted returns as these are
practically more relevant – an aspect that is neglected by
several studies including Fabozzi et al. (2008) and Hong and
Kacperczyk (2009).
Turning to the coefficient estimates on the four risk
factors, it appears that the size of the estimates on the
MSCI market returns are only slightly affected by the
inclusion of the additional risk factors and all maintain
their high statistical significance. The estimates on the size
factor are intuitive. They are positive and significant for all
equal-weighted portfolios due to the overexposure to
small-capitalisation stocks induced by the weighting
scheme and they turn negative when value-weighting the
returns. The latter indicates that the excluded companies
tend to be larger than the average company in the MSCI
universe, after accounting for the companies’ market cap-
italisation. This is in line with anecdotal evidence that the
GPFG and the AP-funds rather focus on large and more
publicly visible companies when it comes to their divest-
ment decisions (e.g. Clark and Monk 2010). Apart from
AP7, none of the funds’ exclusion portfolios has a signif-
icant exposure to value or growth stocks as shown by the
insignificant coefficient estimates on the HML factor. The
momentum factors show weak significance in explaining
the portfolios’ return variation, with only two cases of
statistically significant factor exposure (i.e. AP7’s value-
weighted and AP1-4’s equal-weighted exclusion portfolio).
Thus, contrary to previous literature (e.g. Bauer et al. 2005;
Galema et al. 2008; Statman and Glushkov 2009), we do
not find strong evidence that unethical companies load
significantly differently on the standard risk factors, with
the exception of the size factor.
Performance Results by Screen
Previous research suggests that the performance impact of
exclusions is conditional on the reason for exclusion (e.g.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics on portfolio returns
AP7 AP1–4 GPFG
Equal weighted Value weighted Equal weighted Value weighted Equal weighted Value
weighted
Panel A: all excluded companies
Mean 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.006
SD 0.055 0.040 0.062 0.040 0.056 0.045
Min -0.219 -0.116 -0.285 -0.131 -0.274 -0.173
Max 0.195 0.101 0.225 0.099 0.182 0.108
Count 166 166 109 109 162 162
Panel B: mean returns by exclusionary screen
Human rights issues 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.011 0.006
Labour rights issues 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.004 – –
Environmental issues 0.007 0.005 -0.040 -0.041 0.000 -0.006
Controversial weapons 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.008
Tobacco – – – – 0.012 0.013
This table reports descriptive statistics for the equal-weighted and value-weighted continuously compounded returns of the portfolios of
excluded companies for the AP7, the AP1–4 and the GPFG funds. Panel A focuses on the portfolios consisting of all companies excluded by a
fund during a particular time. Panel B reports average continuously compounded portfolio returns sorted by the reason for exclusion. For the
value-weighting, companies are weighted by their market capitalisation of the previous month in order to prevent any look-ahead bias
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Barnett and Salomon 2006; Capelle-Blancard and Monjon
2014; Trinks and Scholtens 2015) and the results in
Table 2 draw a similar picture. Thus, in this section, we re-
run the performance analyses based on portfolios sorted by
different exclusionary screens. The results are presented in
Table 4. To save space, we report only the alpha estimates,
adjusted R2 values and the number of observations for each
specification.
Overall, we do not find a systematic pattern of abnormal
returns based on a specific type of exclusionary screen.
From the 24 CAPM specifications presented in Panel A,
only six exclusion portfolios generate significant abnormal
returns, of which four positively outperform the benchmark
and two significantly underperform. For the statistically
more accurate Four-Factor model presented in Panel B (see
Adamsson and Hoepner 2015), two portfolios generate a
positive abnormal return. However, these cases of abnor-
mal performance seem to be rather related to the particular
fund or weighting scheme and are only of weak statistical
significance. This finding indicates that the performance
effect is not systematically linked to the unethical beha-
viour of the portfolio companies but rather a result of the
portfolio construction process. The only possible exception
is the outperformance of tobacco stocks, which remains
significant in three out of four cases. However, we are
cautious in drawing too strong conclusions from this
finding. While it might appear as a confirmation of the
previous literature (e.g. Hong and Kacperczyk 2009; Trinks
and Scholtens 2015), which finds tobacco stocks to out-
perform the market, tobacco stocks do not outperform in
the most relevant of these four specifications—value-
weighted portfolio returns in a Four-Factor model. Hence,
Adamsson and Hoepner’s (2015) thesis that the previous
literature only found a small stocks effect among sin stocks
instead of a true tobacco-related effect remains valid, since
equal-weighted portfolios overemphasise small stocks and
resemble real-world investors much less than value-
weighted portfolios. In any case, since the tobacco screen is
the only purely sector-based screen analysed in this study
the pattern of results observed in Table 4 is in line with our
hypothesis H2a. In comparison, the finding of an
insignificant performance effect for the norm-based
screening does not support our hypothesis H2b which
predicts companies excluded due to violations of
Table 3 Main performance results
AP7 AP1–4 GPFG
Equal weighted Value weighted Equal weighted Value weighted Equal weighted Value weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: CAPM model
Alpha 0.00450*** (2.632) 0.00286* (1.833) 0.00373 (1.192) 0.00346 (1.127) 0.00425* (1.654) 0.00364 (1.618)
MSCI 1.067*** (27.642) 0.755*** (17.640) 1.044*** (11.652) 0.495*** (7.592) 0.962*** (12.445) 0.737*** (14.479)
Observations 166 166 109 109 162 162
R2 0.835 0.766 0.731 0.393 0.667 0.595
Adj. R2 0.834 0.765 0.728 0.387 0.665 0.593
AP7 AP1–4 GPFG
Equal weighted Value weighted Equal weighted Value weighted Equal weighted Value weighted
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel B: four-factor model
Alpha 0.00361** (2.040) 0.00204 (1.299) 0.00519* (1.707) 0.00345 (1.194) 0.00373 (1.277) 0.00292 (1.168)
MSCI 1.040*** (26.396) 0.791*** (18.656) 0.950*** (11.700) 0.489*** (6.367) 0.956*** (14.269) 0.780*** (15.631)
SMB 0.393*** (3.119) -0.216** (-2.160) 0.436** (2.396) -0.766*** (-3.755) 0.419*** (2.686) -0.0906 (-0.652)
HML 0.232* (1.917) 0.172* (1.882) 0.341 (1.386) 0.270 (1.350) -0.0106 (-0.056) 0.0428 (0.301)
WML -0.0416 (-0.568) 0.144** (2.130) -0.208* (-1.793) 0.0458 (0.677) -0.0239 (-0.180) 0.142 (1.439)
Observations 166 166 109 109 162 162
R2 0.855 0.788 0.771 0.491 0.682 0.608
Adj. R2 0.851 0.783 0.763 0.471 0.674 0.598
This table presents the results of the performance analysis of the portfolios comprising all exclusions (independent of the reason for exclusion).
Performance is measured according to two market models. Panel A presents the estimates from a CAPM where the MSCI All Country World
index serves as the market factor. Panel B reports results from a global four-factor model where we add the global size factor (SMB), value factor
(HML) and momentum factor (WML) to the market factor (MSCI). The dependent variables are the continuously compounded excess returns on
the equal- or value-weighted exclusion portfolios of one of the three funds. Robust t ratios are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels, respectively
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international norms to underperform relative to the market.
However, we acknowledge that a thorough analysis of the
performance differences between norm-based and sector-
based screening would require a more comprehensive set
of sector-based screens. Our findings confirm those of
Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) who compare the
performance of 116 French SRI mutual funds that perform
either sectoral or norm-based screens. While arriving at the
same conclusion, our analysis differs from that of Capelle-
Blancard and Monjon (2014) in several ways. Firstly, we
focus on a completely different investor class that is subject
to different tensions between the ethical and financial
demands of their beneficiaries. Secondly, Capelle-Blancard
and Monjon (2014) can only observe performance at the
fund level. Given the high heterogeneity across SRI mutual
funds, they cannot clearly disentangle the performance
impact of the exclusionary screening from that of other
fund-related factors such as managerial skill (e.g. Hum-
phrey and Tan, 2014). And finally, since they do not know
what companies are excluded by the different funds they
cannot validate whether the funds truly perform the
exclusionary screens that they state.
Robustness Tests
Long-Short Portfolios
In this section, we test the robustness of our results. First,
we re-visit the question of the effect of different screens on
performance. In particular, we look at the differential
impact of screens for norm-based and sector-based exclu-
sions. We argue that while most of the screens do not
significantly impact returns when analysed individually,
they might show a significant performance difference when
comparing them in relation to one another. To filter out
these relative performance effects, we construct long-short
portfolios within the categories of norm-based screening
and sector-based screening. Long-short portfolios invest a
certain amount of money in one set of companies (long
portfolio), while at the same time short selling a different
set of companies (short portfolio) matching the investment
in the long portfolio. A special feature of long-short port-
folios is that ideally they do not have exposure to the
overall market risk as potential value increases (decreases)
experienced by the companies in the long portfolio are
automatically cancelled out by respective decreases (in-
creases) in value in the short portfolio. Instead, long-short
portfolios accentuate differences in performance that relate
to the sorting criteria. Due to these special features, long-
short portfolios have been frequently employed in the lit-
erature on exclusionary screening (e.g. Kempf and Osthoff
2007; Statman and Glushkov 2009; Hong and Kacperczyk
2009) and SRI more generally (e.g. Derwall et al. 2005).
To illustrate the underlying logic of long-short portfolios,
let us consider a portfolio that invests in the human rights
exclusions and that is short in the labour rights exclusions.
If it was financially harmful to exclude companies based on
human rights issues relative to labour rights issues, we
should find a positive abnormal return on this long-short
portfolio. We construct long-short portfolios for all screen
combinations within the norm-based screening category
and the sector-based screening category in the same way.
While the only pure sector-based screen in our sample is
the tobacco screen, we also classify the controversial
weapons screen as sector-based for the sake of this anal-
ysis. However, strictly speaking it should be considered a
norm-based screen as funds do not systematically exclude
the military and arms industry but only companies that are
associated with the production and sale of weaponry that
violates international conventions, such as cluster bombs
and anti-personnel mines.
The results are presented in Table 5. Overall, we do not
find a consistent differential performance effect within the
two screening categories. All abnormal returns on specific
long-short portfolios lose their statistical significance when
changing the market model or the weighting scheme. This
further supports our main finding that exclusionary
screening does not significantly impact fund performance.
Industry-Specific Risk Factors
In our market models we employ risk factors that are
constructed on a global economy level. Thus, we implicitly
average the effects of these risk-factors over industries and
regions. Adamsson and Hoepner (2015), however, show
that risk characteristics, such as size, value and momentum,
vary across sectors and that conditioning on industry-
specific risk factors affects the performance implications of
exclusionary screening (see also Li et al. 2006; Hanhardt
and Ansotegui 2008). While this is unlikely to affect our
findings regarding the norm-based screens—exclusions due
to violations of norms are not industry-dependent—we
cannot rule out that our sector-based screening results are
driven by industry-specific risk factors. In fact, the tobacco
analysis suggests that the way we control for the size of the
companies affects our conclusion regarding the perfor-
mance implications of this screen. To address this issue, we
introduce industry-specific risk factors to the Four-Factor
model and re-run the analysis for the controversial weap-
ons and tobacco screens. For the industry market factor, we
use the corresponding MSCI All Country World industry
indices (i.e. aerospace & defence for controversial weapons
and tobacco for the tobacco screen). To construct the
industry-based size, value and momentum factors, we use
the Style Research database and construct the factors in
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accordance with the global size, value and momentum
factors, described in ‘‘Methodology’’ section.29 As the
global risk factors are likely highly correlated with the
industry-specific risk factors, we only add the differential
industry effects of the risk factors to the model, using the
orthogonalisation approach suggested by Elton et al. (1993)
and applied in Adamsson and Hoepner (2015).30 Table 6
presents the results when adding industry-style factors to
the Four-Factor model.
We find that our main results do not significantly change
although the t-statistics on the value-weighted portfolios
shrink significantly and are now much closer to zero than to
common significance levels. Still, only the equal-weighted
portfolio of excluded tobacco companies generates a pos-
itive abnormal return of about 3.9 % per annum, confirm-
ing the patterns observed in the main analysis. Again, due
to the low practical relevance of equal-weighted portfolios
for the funds in our sample, we are cautious in drawing too
strong performance implications based on this estimate. In
contrast, these results are consistent with the finding by
Adamsson and Hoepner (2015) that tobacco portfolios do
not outperform in a real-world setting on a risk-and-factor-
adjusted basis and hence their exclusion is not financially
detrimental.
Sub-Sample Analysis
As another robustness test, we check whether our findings
are the result of individual company effects due to the low
number of excluded companies in the early part of the
sample. To rule out this possibility, we restrict our sample
to the years 2008–2015. From 2008 onwards, each fund
excluded at least 13 companies, while most had a consid-
erably larger number of exclusions (Table 1), assuring a
reasonably diversified portfolio. The results of this sub-
sample analysis are presented in Table 7.
The majority of the estimates remain qualitatively
unchanged. Individual estimates become marginally sig-
nificant or lose their significance over the sub-period.
However, the cases of significant abnormal performance
still tend to be fund-specific and/or depend on the
weighting of returns. Thus, the sub-sample analysis indi-
cates that our main results are unlikely to be driven by the
dominance of single excluded companies in the early part
of the sample.
Risk Comparison
While our main analysis focuses on the impact of exclu-
sionary screening on funds’ (risk-adjusted) returns, as a
final robustness test, we address the question of whether the
exclusion of unethical companies affects funds’ risk char-
acteristics. This analysis is partially motivated by the view
that exclusionary screening is less a return enhancing but
rather a risk-management tool. In line with this argument,
Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria (2004) show that socially
responsible portfolios have lower total risk as these port-
folios are not exposed to the risks associated with com-
panies’ unethical business practices such as legal actions,
strikes, boycotts and reputational damages, which the
authors refer to as the unethical component of total risk. In
addition, Lee et al. (2010) and Humphrey and Lee (2011)
analyse the risk implications of exclusionary screening for
samples of U.S. and Australian SRI mutual funds, respec-
tively. However, the two studies arrive at different con-
clusions as to whether exclusionary screening increases or
decreases portfolio risk, suggesting that the risk implica-
tions of exclusionary screening might depend on the way
that exclusionary screens are applied in practice.
Inspired by Blake et al. (2013) and Hoepner et al.
(2013), we test the risk implications of exclusionary
screening by comparing the riskiness of the exclusion
portfolios to that of the funds’ benchmark index. Since the
concept and definition of financial risk is not undisputed
and many different risk measures have been suggested over
the years, we employ a variety of risk measures that cap-
ture different aspects of financial risks. Firstly, following
Lee et al. (2010) and Humphrey and Lee (2011), we
examine the total risk of the portfolios as measured by the
standard deviation of returns. The standard deviation of
returns is a conventional risk measure in the finance liter-
ature to capture any deviations from an expected return,
both negative and positive. We calculate the standard










where sdp is the standard deviation of daily excess returns
of portfolio p over the recent month, rxp,t is the daily return
in excess of the risk-free rate of portfolio p on day t, rxp is
the average daily excess return of portfolio p over the
29 Style Research only allows us to construct style factors at a broad
sector level, i.e. for the tobacco industry we are only able to construct
customised factors at the sector level of consumer staples and for the
controversial weapons we are only able to generate the style factors
for the industrial goods sector. In contrast, the MSCI industry indices
are available for the specific industries, i.e. tobacco and aerospace and
defence. To rule out that our results are affected by these different
industry classifications, we replace the more specific MSCI industries
with the MSCI sector returns matching the style sectors. The results
remain qualitatively unchanged, except for AP1–AP4’s equal-
weighted portfolio of controversial weapons which now generates a
significantly positive abnormal return.
30 Each industry-level style factor is regressed on the corresponding
economy-level factor. The clean, orthogonalised factor is represented
by the residual plus the intercept of that regression.
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recent month, and T is equal to the number of trading days
of the recent month.
Following Hoepner et al. (2013), we also employ several
downside risk measures. These measures only account for
the risk of negative deviations of returns from investors’
expectation. In this sense, these measures better capture the
risks associated with unethical business practices, such as
unexpected and large negative shocks to returns, e.g. due to
costs of lawsuits, strikes and boycotts. They also more
strongly reflect investors’ real attitudes towards risk as
investors tend to fear losses but welcome larger than
expected gains.
One measure that accounts for this asymmetry is the
semi standard deviation, which can be regarded as a special
case of the conventional standard deviation discussed
above. The semi standard deviation only accounts for the













where ssdp is the semi standard deviation of daily excess
returns of portfolio p over the recent month. The maximum
function assures that only returns below rxp are considered.
In addition, we rely on several versions of the Lower
Partial Moment (LPM3) which is a commonly applied
downside risk measure in more severe market conditions
(Hoepner et al., 2013). The LPM3 is calculated as:










where LPM3p is the lower partial moment of daily excess
returns of portfolio p over the recent month and u is the
investor’s minimally acceptable return.
The LPM3 assumes highly risk-averse investors as it
punishes large negative returns more strongly than small
negative returns (i.e. it cubes instead of squares downside
deviations). Lower Partial Moments are generally highly
customisable and thus allow us to capture a variety of
investor expectations and levels of risk aversion, whereby
the magnitude of risk aversion increases with higher
exponents (Eling and Schuhmacher 2007; Kaplan and
Knowles 2004). Following Kaplan and Knowles (2004)
and Hoepner et al. (2013), we choose an exponent of three
(i.e. LPM3), though our results are qualitatively unchanged
when using a less conservative exponent of two instead.
We use two alternatives for the minimally acceptable re-
turn u to capture different investor expectations. Firstly,
we employ the average monthly excess return of the
portfolio p (i.e. u ¼ rxp). Secondly, we require returns to be
non-negative (i.e. u = 0). The latter case indirectly
accounts for the possibility that the asset owners in our
study might not be return maximising but invest against
their share of a notional long-term liability. While we do
not have access to the liability data of the AP-funds or the
GPFG and hence cannot study this ambition in more detail,
it seems reasonable to assume that asset owners investing
against their share of notional long-term liabilities do not
want to see the assets diminished in absolute terms.
Finally, we are interested in the highest possible loss
that the portfolios might incur over a given investment
period. This is captured by the minimum daily excess
return of a portfolio over the recent month. This minimum
return provides a good indication of whether excluding
unethical companies protects the funds from incurring very
large losses. The minimum return is calculated as:
min:returnxp ¼ minxp;T ; ð8Þ
where minxp,T represents the minimum daily excess return
on portfolio p over the recent month with T number of
days.
Table 8 presents the estimates of the various risk mea-
sures for the MSCI index and the exclusion portfolios. We
only report results on the value-weighted exclusion port-
folios as they are more practically relevant for the funds’
performance measurement and more suitable when com-
pared to the (value-weighted) MSCI index. Panel A reports
the monthly averages of the risk characteristics (together
with their standard deviations in brackets) while Panel B
shows the results of a paired t-test on the mean values for
the MSCI index vis-a`-vis the exclusion portfolios. The
paired t-test is a standard statistical test that allows a
comparison of mean values derived from different samples.
It indicates whether the difference between the mean val-
ues is statistically significant or whether it could also
simply be a result of large measurement error. Thus this
test is particularly applicable in our case where the sample
lengths of the exclusion portfolios differ across funds. As
expected, the MSCI index exhibits the lowest risk based on
all risk measures since it represents a more diversified
portfolio compared to the exclusion portfolios, with a total
of 2491 constituents as of the end of 2015. However, the
daily returns of AP7’s exclusion portfolio show compara-
ble risk features, with only a slightly higher standard
deviation and a slightly lower minimum return. In com-
parison, GPFG’s exclusion portfolio appears the riskiest of
all as it has the greatest average standard deviation, the
lowest minimum daily returns, and features the highest
values for the LPM3 measures.
Next, we assess whether the riskiness of the funds’
exclusion portfolios is statistically different from that of the
MSCI benchmark index and hence, whether excluding
these companies likely increases or decreases the funds’
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risk. To do so, we turn to the results of the paired t-test on
the means of the risk measures, presented in Panel B of
Table 8. Only GPFG’s exclusion portfolio seems to sys-
tematically differ from the MSCI. In particular, as indi-
cated by the majority of risk measures, the GPFG’s
exclusion portfolio tends to be riskier than the MSCI index.
This implies that excluding these companies might protect
GPFG from incurring losses. In comparison, the exclusions
of the AP-funds are unlikely to result in significant risk
implications for their overall portfolios.
Conclusion
Divesting from companies that are associated with uneth-
ical business practices, such as the violation of human and
labour rights or environmental pollution, represents one
way to protect investors against complicity in these activ-
ities. In particular, two of the world’s largest public asset
owners, Norway’s GPFG and Sweden’s AP-funds, have
adopted such exclusionary screening to ensure that their
investments live up to the ethical standards expected from
them by the general public. However, the funds also need
to meet the financial objectives set out by the national
legislation which requires them to maximise financial
returns. As previous research suggests that exclusionary
screening harms financial performance, the conflicting
expectations of meeting ethical standards while maximis-
ing financial wealth present the funds with a dilemma:
Does the exclusion of unethical companies inevitably mean
sacrificing financial returns or can investors achieve both,
their financial and ethical objectives? This is the question
that we address in this study. In particular, we empirically
analyse the performance effect of excluding companies
from the investment universe of the GPFG and the AP-
funds. We find that these exclusions neither financially
harm the funds nor do they increase fund performance.
This finding holds, both across funds and across different
screening types. The only exception is the equal-weighted
exclusionary screen of tobacco, which tends to outperform
the fund’s benchmark. While this finding provides initial
evidence that the performance effect differs between norm-
based and sector-based exclusionary screens we are very
cautious when interpreting this finding, since the respective
value-weighted portfolio does not outperform and hence
this finding is more likely to result from small stocks
effects than any tobacco characteristics (see also Adamsson
and Hoepner 2015). Overall, we conclude that the exclu-
sionary screening practiced by the GPFG and the AP-funds
enables the funds to incorporate their beneficiaries’ interest
without compromising returns and might provide a
promising route for other (non-SRI) investors to avoid
criticism regarding their legitimacy and social usefulness
that has emerged after the financial crisis.
Table 8 Risk measures for the MSCI index and the exclusion portfolios
MSCI GFPG AP7 AP1–4
Panel A
Standard deviation 0.0088 (0.0055) 0.0105 (0.0056) 0.0093 (0.0055) 0.0096 (0.0053)
Semi standard deviation 0.0062 (0.0039) 0.0073 (0.0042) 0.0065 (0.0040) 0.0067 (0.0039)
LPM3 (rp as min. acc. return) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
LPM3 (0 as min. acc. return) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Minimum return -0.0175 (0.0124) -0.0213 (0.0135) -0.0183 (0.0108) -0.0195 (0.0124)
Difference between MSCI and…
GPFG AP7 AP1–4
Panel B
Standard deviation -0.0017*** (-5.9022) -0.0005*** (-3.7693) -0.0002 (-0.6570)
Semi standard deviation -0.0011*** (-4.4803) -0.0002 (-1.5690) 0.00003 (0.1254)
LPM3 (rp as min. acc. return) -0.000001* (-1.6752) 0.0000 (-0.6526) 0.0000 (0.0444)
LPM3 (0 as min. acc. return) 0.000000 (-1.1054) 0.00000 (0.2371) 0.000001 (1.6091)
Minimum return 0.0038*** (3.3318) 0.0008 (1.0965) -0.0001 (-0.1262)
Panel A reports mean values and standard deviations (in brackets) of the monthly risk measures for the MSCI index and the value-weighted
exclusion portfolios of the three fund groups. Panel B reports mean differences in the monthly risk measures for the MSCI index and these
exclusion portfolios. The numbers in brackets represent t values for a paired t test of the mean values of the MSCI vis-a`-vis the funds’ exclusion
portfolios. The calculation of the risk measures is described in ‘‘Risk Comparison’’ section. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5
and 1 % levels, respectively
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However, our findings are subject to several limitations.
Firstly, we are cautious in extending our findings of an
insignificant performance effect of exclusionary screening
on any form of exclusionary screens adopted by investors.
Instead, we acknowledge that the relation between per-
formance and exclusionary screens depends on the type
and extent of the screens (Barnett and Salomon 2006;
Renneboog et al. 2008b; Capelle-Blancard and Monjon
2014; Trinks and Scholtens 2015). For instance, investors
from other societal backgrounds might be bound by dif-
ferent ethical obligations, whose impact on performance
has not been analysed in this study (e.g. Salaber 2013;
Fauver and McDonald 2014; Liu et al. 2014; Adamsson
and Hoepner 2015). In addition, in unreported results we
find great differences across the exclusion lists of compa-
rable investors even in the Scandinavian SRI market which
is known for its uniform approach towards exclusionary
screening and a relatively homogeneous set of ethical
standards (Bengtsson 2008a; Jensen 2016a).31 Thus, while
exclusionary screening offers a promising way to align
ethical and financial objectives, the performance implica-
tions might strongly depend on the fund’s particular
screening approach as well as the ethical norms it
represents.
Secondly, our study, in line with the majority of the
academic literature, has only evaluated the financial
implications of exclusionary screening, hence implicitly
assuming that the applied screens satisfy the ethical
demands of investors. However, given that these funds
represent the interests of the entire population, including
future generations, this assumption cannot be easily satis-
fied. To overcome this problem, the funds base their ethical
standards on a set of minimally agreed principles, which
are defined by the national laws as well as the states’
commitments to international conventions. However, since
the funds only react in hindsight (and often with a signif-
icant time lag) to accusations of breaches of these standards
it would be an interesting route for future research to
investigate whether exclusionary screening actually redu-
ces funds’ exposure to unethical business practices and thus
achieves the objective of avoiding complicity in severe
violations of ethical standards.
Thirdly, our findings do not provide any normative
guidance as to what objectives should be given priority to,
the ethical objectives or the financial objectives. This
question is particularly relevant for the funds in our sample
and distinguishes our study from the numerous studies on
SRI mutual funds, as contrary to mutual fund investors, the
beneficiaries of the GPFG and the AP-funds cannot exit the
funds if they disagree with the funds’ investment approach.
While the legal guidelines of the Swedish AP-funds can be
understood as prioritising financial objectives over ethical
ones (e.g. Du Rietz 2016), Sandberg et al. (2014) criticise
these regulations as too abstract and vague. In comparison,
the guidelines given to the GPFG do not provide any
instructions on how to resolve conflicts between ethical and
financial objectives (Richardson 2011). Thus, a clarifica-
tion of the funds’ objectives and a clear prioritisation
regarding ethical and financial demands by the legislator
would not only relieve the funds from this conflict. This
clarification might have the additional benefit of improving
fund governance by reducing the scope to which other
interests, especially political interests, might influence the
funds’ exclusion decisions. The latter has been a constant
point of criticism that these funds have to face and that
undermines their legitimacy with the general public (e.g.
Clark and Monk 2010; Richardson 2011).32
Moreover, while exclusionary screening can represent a
powerful tool for legislators and policy makers to safe-
guard themselves against accusations of complicity in
unethical behaviour, exclusionary screening, by itself, does
not represent an appropriate tool for addressing societal
and social change. For instance, considering the issue of
climate change which both, the GPFG and the AP-funds,
acknowledge as one of their major challenges in the future,
Richardson (2011) points out that climate change is caused
by the aggregate of small-scale environmental damages
while exclusions only target ‘‘severe environmental dam-
age’’. In other words, the threshold that leads to action is
too high to meaningfully tackle climate change. Thus, in
order to target social challenges such as climate change,
diversity and equality, exclusionary screening has to be
combined with other approaches such as engagement and
dialogue that encourage companies to change their busi-
ness practices.
Finally, an interesting question, though not the focus of
our study, are the implications of the exclusionary
31 In unreported results, we compare the most recent exclusion lists
of 12 Scandinavian asset owners and asset managers to the exclusion
lists of the GPFG and the AP-funds and find great heterogeneity
across the lists. For instance, of the 191 different companies that were
excluded, only 1.6 % were excluded by all funds and 36 % only
appeared on the list of a single fund. The exclusion list of GPFG
covers 34 % of all excluded companies, while AP7 covers 24 % and
AP1–4 only 11 %, respectively. These findings are in line with those
of Blanc and Cozic (2012) who compare the exclusion lists of several
European investors. Limits in data availability and quality do not
allow us to perform a more formal analysis of the performance
implications of the exclusions adopted by the Scandinavian investors.
Results of this preliminary comparison are available from the authors
upon request.
32 A striking illustration of political interests impacting exclusion
decisions is the AP-funds’ different treatment of SAS, Scandinavian
Airlines System, in which the Swedish state is a large shareholder.
While AP7 excluded the company as early as 2004 after SAS has
been accused of breaching international competition law, SAS is still
part of the other AP-funds’ portfolios (Bengtsson 2008a).
On the Price of Morals in Markets: An Empirical Study of the Swedish AP-Funds and the…
123
screening for the excluded companies. Proponents of the
exclusionary screening approach often claim that coordi-
nated exclusions by investors might depress the stock price
of the company and put pressure on the company to change
its business practices. However, prior studies that analyse
such coordinated divestments of large investor groups, e.g.
the divestment of U.S. public asset owners from companies
in South Africa during the Apartheid regime (Teoh et al.
1999; Grossman and Sharpe 1986; Ennis and Parkhill
1986; Wagner et al. 1984) or the Sudan Divestment Act in
2007 (GAO 2010), found little impact of these actions on
the divested companies. This is in line with theoretical
findings by Heinkel et al. (2001) who conclude that
divestments only have the potential to change corporate
behaviour when they are adopted by a critical number of
investors representing a significant share of a company’s
shareholdings. Nevertheless, there is some anecdotal evi-
dence that exclusions can occasionally initiate the desired
change. For instance, after GPFG had excluded Rio Tinto,
the company sought re-inclusion and GPFG entered a
dialogue with Rio Tinto about how it could redeem itself
(Richardson 2011). A more uniform approach of norm-
based divestments among global asset owners might
increase their influence on corporations and the reputa-
tional costs to the shunned company, and lead to more
companies like Rio Tinto entering into a dialogue with the
asset owners. First attempts of creating a universal list of
‘‘unethical’’ companies to guide exclusion decisions have
been discussed by Belgian policy makers and provide a
promising route for future regulations (Blanc and Cozic
2012).
Thus, to conclude our findings have important impli-
cations for the funds in our sample and especially their
fund governance, for legislator and policy-makers, for
other global investors, as well as for the excluded com-
panies. Having focused on the exclusionary screens of two
large public asset owners, we have extended the literature
on exclusionary screening by studying a widely underrep-
resented investor group and underexplored type of screen.
However, as the above discussion highlights our findings
pose additional questions that represent interesting oppor-
tunities for future research.
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